The Cybernetic Jungle: Difference between revisions
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Despite its failure, Igloo White was an important precursor to the kind of remote-controlled warfare those in Pakistan have to undergo on a weekly basis. It set the precedent of ordinary soldiers fighting on the frontline from a computer terminal in a bunker, distant from the battlefield itself. While similar endeavors were explored during World War II and the MAD, early decades of the Cold War, Igloo White could be seen as ''the'' field test for contemporary drone warfare, and in this way only could it be seen as a worthwhile campaign. | Despite its failure, Igloo White was an important precursor to the kind of remote-controlled warfare those in Pakistan have to undergo on a weekly basis. It set the precedent of ordinary soldiers fighting on the frontline from a computer terminal in a bunker, distant from the battlefield itself. While similar endeavors were explored during World War II and the MAD, early decades of the Cold War, Igloo White could be seen as ''the'' field test for contemporary drone warfare, and in this way only could it be seen as a worthwhile campaign. | ||
As with the majority of US military campaigns featuring experimental technologies, the raw materials for Igloo White were developed at MIT in the late 1960s with a R&D group known as [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/JASON_Defense_Advisory_Group JASON]. The idea was to create a network of sensors along the [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ho_Chi_Minh_trail Ho Chi Minh Trail], a transport route of strategic importance that ran through the jungles of North Vietnam into the South, through Laos and Cambodia. A variety of sensors were used in the operation: vibration sensors to detect movement of truck convoys, microphones to pick up the speech of the enemy soldiers, and even sensors that could detect the scent of urine. <ref> Edwards, Paul N. ''Closed World: Computers and the Politics of Discourse in Cold War America'' (1996) p3</ref> | As with the majority of US military campaigns featuring experimental technologies, the raw materials for Igloo White were developed at MIT in the late 1960s with a R&D group known as [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/JASON_Defense_Advisory_Group JASON]. The idea was to create a network of sensors along the [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ho_Chi_Minh_trail Ho Chi Minh Trail], a transport route of strategic importance that ran through the jungles of North Vietnam into the South, through Laos and Cambodia. A variety of sensors were used in the operation: vibration sensors to detect movement of truck convoys, microphones to pick up the speech of the enemy soldiers, and even sensors that could detect the scent of urine. <ref name="Edwards"> Edwards, Paul N. ''Closed World: Computers and the Politics of Discourse in Cold War America'' (1996) p3</ref> The sensors were mostly dispersed by air - like seedlings, designed to embed themselves in the ground and appear like small plants, or get caught in the jungle canopy disguised amongst the trees, quietly emitting data streams via radiowaves. | ||
The network was controlled and observed from a US military command center hundreds of kilometers to the North West in Nakhom Phanom, Thailand. | The network was controlled and observed from a US military command center hundreds of kilometers to the North West in Nakhom Phanom, Thailand. Soldiers would turn up for work in a windowless bunker in full uniform, watching over the network for unusual patterns in the incoming data that might suggest suspicious activity. By analysing the data collected from a number of sensors proximate to one another, the size of a convoy could be ascertained, and perhaps what type of vehicles are being used, and so on. The soldier could then order an air strike of the area: | ||
"The planes' navigation systems and computers automatically guided them to the "box", or map grid square, to be attacked. The ISC central computers were also able to control the release of bombs: the pilot might do no more than sit and watch as the invisible jungle below suddenly exploded into flames. In most cases, no American ever actually saw the target at all."<ref name="Edwards"/> | |||
The "otherness" of the enemy becomes further abstracted through its representation as a flow of numbers, or a glowing white light on a computer monitor. The only sensor that managed a direct representation of the | |||
Revision as of 10:31, 26 September 2012
About
Like many controversial conflicts during the Vietnam war, "Operation Igloo White" remains somewhat obscured to popular history. Considering its great potential as another bombastic propaganda film illustrating the ingenuity of the US military and its patriotic spirit, it is perhaps surprising that it hasn't yet been given the full [Michael Bay http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Michael_Bay] stars 'n' stripes treatment. Then again, one probable reason why Igloo White: The Movie hasn't featured in a cineplex near you is that it is considered to be a major military controversy, and another entry on the long list of induced 'Nam amnesia.
Despite its failure, Igloo White was an important precursor to the kind of remote-controlled warfare those in Pakistan have to undergo on a weekly basis. It set the precedent of ordinary soldiers fighting on the frontline from a computer terminal in a bunker, distant from the battlefield itself. While similar endeavors were explored during World War II and the MAD, early decades of the Cold War, Igloo White could be seen as the field test for contemporary drone warfare, and in this way only could it be seen as a worthwhile campaign.
As with the majority of US military campaigns featuring experimental technologies, the raw materials for Igloo White were developed at MIT in the late 1960s with a R&D group known as JASON. The idea was to create a network of sensors along the Ho Chi Minh Trail, a transport route of strategic importance that ran through the jungles of North Vietnam into the South, through Laos and Cambodia. A variety of sensors were used in the operation: vibration sensors to detect movement of truck convoys, microphones to pick up the speech of the enemy soldiers, and even sensors that could detect the scent of urine. [1] The sensors were mostly dispersed by air - like seedlings, designed to embed themselves in the ground and appear like small plants, or get caught in the jungle canopy disguised amongst the trees, quietly emitting data streams via radiowaves.
The network was controlled and observed from a US military command center hundreds of kilometers to the North West in Nakhom Phanom, Thailand. Soldiers would turn up for work in a windowless bunker in full uniform, watching over the network for unusual patterns in the incoming data that might suggest suspicious activity. By analysing the data collected from a number of sensors proximate to one another, the size of a convoy could be ascertained, and perhaps what type of vehicles are being used, and so on. The soldier could then order an air strike of the area: "The planes' navigation systems and computers automatically guided them to the "box", or map grid square, to be attacked. The ISC central computers were also able to control the release of bombs: the pilot might do no more than sit and watch as the invisible jungle below suddenly exploded into flames. In most cases, no American ever actually saw the target at all."[1]
The "otherness" of the enemy becomes further abstracted through its representation as a flow of numbers, or a glowing white light on a computer monitor. The only sensor that managed a direct representation of the