Dave Young - Thesis Proposal: Difference between revisions
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==Concrete== | ==Concrete== | ||
''Tags:''' Firing Squads / Networks / Power / Control / Automation | '''Tags:''' Firing Squads / Networks / Power / Control / Automation | ||
'''Aim:'''<br> To investigate how power is distributed and disguised in decentralised networks, with reference to the development of networked computer technologies since the early days of the Cold War. | '''Aim:'''<br> To investigate how power is distributed and disguised in decentralised networks, with reference to the development of networked computer technologies since the early days of the Cold War. | ||
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However, such a network topology can also disguise a power dynamic, making it unclear exactly who, if anyone, is in control. I would like to explore how modern network technologies used in military strategy relate the 'firing squad' paradigm of disguising power through decentralised control. | However, such a network topology can also disguise a power dynamic, making it unclear exactly who, if anyone, is in control. I would like to explore how modern network technologies used in military strategy relate the 'firing squad' paradigm of disguising power through decentralised control. | ||
'''Power / Control'''<br> | '''Power / Control'''<br> | ||
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To reiterate the dominant threads within my proposed thesis: | To reiterate the dominant threads within my proposed thesis: | ||
The use of the computer as a decision-making agent further complicates the power dynamic within a network – in such a system, who is responsible? Who can be held accountable in the event of a catastrophic mistake? And is the abstraction of power through the use of distributed and automatic technologies a strategic decision? | The use of the computer as a decision-making agent further complicates the power dynamic within a network – in such a system, who is responsible? Who can be held accountable in the event of a catastrophic mistake? And is the abstraction of power through the use of distributed and automatic technologies a strategic decision? | ||
==Abstract== | |||
In this thesis, I am to investigate how power and control can be abstracted and/or disguised in decentralised networks, with reference to the development of networked military technologies since the early days of the Cold War. The firing squad can be seen as an historical example of a military tradition that distributes power and responsibility among multiple soldiers, partially as a means to disguise the identity of the soldier who fired the lethal shot. | |||
The same ideas of distributed control / distributed responsibility have been assimilated into modern military strategies in a much more sophisticated manner, largely enabled by the increased power and capabilities of the computer. I would like to argue that in a decentralised network where both humans and machines play an active role in the processing of information and the making of decisions, the dynamics of power (and thus responsibility) become abstracted, and that this abstraction assists complicity. | |||
==Bibliography== | |||
*Barbrook, Richard Imaginary Futures (2005) | *Barbrook, Richard Imaginary Futures (2005) | ||
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*Zizek, Slavoj (Ed) Mapping Ideology (2012) Verso | *Zizek, Slavoj (Ed) Mapping Ideology (2012) Verso | ||
*Zizek, Slavoj Violence (2009) Profile Books | *Zizek, Slavoj Violence (2009) Profile Books | ||
Revision as of 14:52, 13 January 2013
Concrete
Tags: Firing Squads / Networks / Power / Control / Automation
Aim:
To investigate how power is distributed and disguised in decentralised networks, with reference to the development of networked computer technologies since the early days of the Cold War.
Firing Squads
A firing squad is a method of capital punishment often used during times of war and in some countries, only reserved for soldiers sent for execution. Typically, the firing squad stand facing the prisoner, and given the signal, they all fire simultaneously. In some national traditions, one of the soldiers is given a blank round. By following this system, the soldier who fired the 'lethal shot' remains unknown.
Networks
Distributed network topologies (such as a mesh topology) provides a great opportunity for a group of agents to communicate in a non-hierarchical manner between themselves. Information does not need to pass through a central point – it can travel directly from agent to agent. In modern decentralised networks, the computer can act as a passive agent (passing information from one node to the next, without interruption or modification), or as an active agent (making calculations based on an information input, then passing the results as an output).
However, such a network topology can also disguise a power dynamic, making it unclear exactly who, if anyone, is in control. I would like to explore how modern network technologies used in military strategy relate the 'firing squad' paradigm of disguising power through decentralised control.
Power / Control
Since the early days of the Cold War, the US Military has been developing computer systems which partially replace the traditional functioning of the corporeal soldier. In military operations such as Igloo White in the jungles of SE Asia during the early 70s, the use of sensor networks was experimented with. If the sensors detected the movement of a North Vietnamese munitions convoy moving through the jungle, an automatic airstrike could be ordered to bomb the target by an operative stationed at a remote base far away from the contested territory. The pilot of the plane would not have to drop the bombs – this would be taken care of by the computer system. So in this scenario, the power is distributed between multiple parties gelled together by way of automated network technologies: each action leads directly to the next, creating a linear series of events. Through the breakdown of the responsibilities into multiple separate and decentralised components, there is no longer a single person who can be said to be entirely in control. These methods of decentralised control has become more sophisticated with the increased use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in surveillance and assassination campaigns the Middle East since 2003, whereby multiple pilots control the same UAV, each with their own technical responsibilities.
Automation
Benefiting from the big defense budgets during the Cold War, US research and development groups were able to rapidly innovate in what promised to be the dominant system of military control in the future – the computer. Naturally enough, the computer was quickly adopted as the centerpiece of late 20th century military strategy, passing information between nodes or being an active controlling participant within a network, as in Operation Igloo White.
To reiterate the dominant threads within my proposed thesis: The use of the computer as a decision-making agent further complicates the power dynamic within a network – in such a system, who is responsible? Who can be held accountable in the event of a catastrophic mistake? And is the abstraction of power through the use of distributed and automatic technologies a strategic decision?
Abstract
In this thesis, I am to investigate how power and control can be abstracted and/or disguised in decentralised networks, with reference to the development of networked military technologies since the early days of the Cold War. The firing squad can be seen as an historical example of a military tradition that distributes power and responsibility among multiple soldiers, partially as a means to disguise the identity of the soldier who fired the lethal shot.
The same ideas of distributed control / distributed responsibility have been assimilated into modern military strategies in a much more sophisticated manner, largely enabled by the increased power and capabilities of the computer. I would like to argue that in a decentralised network where both humans and machines play an active role in the processing of information and the making of decisions, the dynamics of power (and thus responsibility) become abstracted, and that this abstraction assists complicity.
Bibliography
- Barbrook, Richard Imaginary Futures (2005)
- Bateson, Gregory Steps Toward an Ecology of Mind (2000) University of Chicago Press, United States.
- Carey, John The Faber Book of Utopias (1999) Faber and Faber, London.
- Deleuze, Gilles and Guattari, Felix Anti-Oedipus
- Edwards, Paul N. The Closed World: Computers and the Politics of Discourse in Cold War America (1996) MIT Press, United States.
- Galison, Peter The Ontology of the Enemy (1994)
- Karatzogianni, Athina Power, Conflict and Resistance: Social Movements, Networks and Hierarchies (with Andrew Robinson) (2010)
- Karatzogianni, Athina The Politics of Cyberconflict (with Andrew Robinson) (2010)
- Poster, Mark and Savat, David (Editors) - Deleuze and New Technology (2009) Edinburgh University Press, UK.
- Spufford, Francis Red Plenty (2010) Faber and Faber, UK.
- Vossoughian, Nader Otto Neurath: The Language of the Global Polis (2008) NAI Publishers, The Netherlands.
- Wiener, Norbert The Human Use of Human Beings: Cybernetics and Society (1988) Da Capo Press.
- Zizek, Slavoj (Ed) Mapping Ideology (2012) Verso
- Zizek, Slavoj Violence (2009) Profile Books