Dave Young - Thesis Proposal

Current

Current thesis state

Concrete

Tags: Firing Squads / Networks / Power / Control / Automation

Aim:
To investigate how power is distributed and disguised in decentralised networks, with reference to the development of networked computer technologies since the early days of the Cold War.

Firing Squads
A firing squad is a method of capital punishment often used during times of war and in some countries, only reserved for soldiers sent for execution. Typically, the firing squad stand facing the prisoner, and given the signal, they all fire simultaneously. In some national traditions, one of the soldiers is given a blank round. By following this system, the soldier who fired the 'lethal shot' remains unknown.

Networks
Distributed network topologies (such as a mesh topology) provides a great opportunity for a group of agents to communicate in a non-hierarchical manner between themselves. Information does not need to pass through a central point – it can travel directly from agent to agent. In modern decentralised networks, the computer can act as a passive agent (passing information from one node to the next, without interruption or modification), or as an active agent (making calculations based on an information input, then passing the results as an output).

However, such a network topology can also disguise a power dynamic, making it unclear exactly who, if anyone, is in control. I would like to explore how modern network technologies used in military strategy relate the 'firing squad' paradigm of disguising power through decentralised control.

Power / Control
Since the early days of the Cold War, the US Military has been developing computer systems which partially replace the traditional functioning of the corporeal soldier. In military operations such as Igloo White in the jungles of SE Asia during the early 70s, the use of sensor networks was experimented with. If the sensors detected the movement of a North Vietnamese munitions convoy moving through the jungle, an automatic airstrike could be ordered to bomb the target by an operative stationed at a remote base far away from the contested territory. The pilot of the plane would not have to drop the bombs – this would be taken care of by the computer system. So in this scenario, the power is distributed between multiple parties gelled together by way of automated network technologies: each action leads directly to the next, creating a linear series of events. Through the breakdown of the responsibilities into multiple separate and decentralised components, there is no longer a single person who can be said to be entirely in control. These methods of decentralised control has become more sophisticated with the increased use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in surveillance and assassination campaigns the Middle East since 2003, whereby multiple pilots control the same UAV, each with their own technical responsibilities.

Automation
Benefiting from the big defense budgets during the Cold War, US research and development groups were able to rapidly innovate in what promised to be the dominant system of military control in the future – the computer. Naturally enough, the computer was quickly adopted as the centerpiece of late 20th century military strategy, passing information between nodes or being an active controlling participant within a network, as in Operation Igloo White.

Discipline / Control
Is the assembly line a paradigm of labour in a disciplinary society? And then is the use of computers in production (effacing the traditional division of labour through automative processes) emblematic of labour systems in a 'control society'? In the first case, the assembly line divides labour in a visible manner - thus, the responsibility of production is disguised through overtly sharing fragments of the industrial process amongst a group of labourers (many doing little). In the latter case, the division of labour becomes complicated and partially invisible through the 'black-boxing' (within an automatic computer system) of certain processes. In this instance, control/power is further abstracted through the delegation of certain tasks to non-human agents (i.e. software/hardware), and also newly introduces the labour of soft/hardware architects and developers.

To reiterate the dominant threads within my proposed thesis: The use of the computer as a decision-making agent further complicates the power dynamic within a network – in such a system, who is responsible? How does this system facilitate obedience and complicity in a production process?

Abstract

In this thesis, I am to investigate how power and control can be abstracted and/or disguised in decentralised networks, with reference to the development of networked military technologies since the early days of the Cold War. The firing squad can be seen as an historical example of a military tradition that distributes power and responsibility among multiple soldiers, partially as a means to disguise the identity of the soldier who fired the lethal shot, and thus to more easily enable each soldier's participation in the firing squad.

The same ideas of distributed control / distributed responsibility have been assimilated into modern military strategies in a much more sophisticated manner, largely enabled by the increased power and capabilities of the computer. I would like to argue that in a decentralised network where both humans and machines play an active role in the processing of information and the making of decisions, the dynamics of power (and thus responsibility) become abstracted, and that this abstraction facilitates complicity.

Plan

/Intro\

Expanded abstract, topic overview, introduce central theme: analysis of the tactical distribution of power and control in order to facilitate complicity in a given process.

/Chapter I\

The first chapter of the thesis will provide an historical context for my argument through the analysis of past examples of institutionalised distributed control systems. By this I mean a system within an institution (the church, the state, the military, industry) in which there is a tactical distribution of power and accountability over a given process in order to encourage complicity. I would like to examine the firing squad as a prime example of a such a system, it being a ritual with processes specifically designed to share the power (and thus disguise the identity of the executioner) among a squad of soldiers. In addition to this, I would like to discuss the use of such systems within industry, with particular reference to the assembly line as a system of distributed control. I would like to finish the chapter by summarising that these systems are designed to abstract the distribution of power in order to permit the participants to engage with a process they might otherwise find objectionable.

/Chapter II\

In the second chapter I would like to introduce the computer as a vital element in contemporary analogues of the systems discussed in the first chapter. With the introduction of a machine as an automative agent in a system, the distribution of power is further abstracted. The burden of power can be placed on the processes controlled by the computer, enabling the human to play a lesser, more observant role in the process. At this point, I would like to differentiate between two roles the computer plays in these systems. Firstly, a computer can act as a passive agent: in this instance, it passes inputted information directly to the network, acting only as a distributor. In the second case, the computer can behave as an active agent in a system, where it processes incoming information before distributing the results to the network. I will then provide examples of how these systems are applied in contemporary contexts, focusing particularly on the increasing levels of automation in military procedures.

/Outro\

I will conclude by discussing again the central question of how the abstraction of power facilitates complicity, and suggesting that the prevalence of computers and automative technologies will increase the abstraction of power in such institutional systems in the future.

Bibliography

• Barbrook, Richard Imaginary Futures (2005)
• Bateson, Gregory Steps Toward an Ecology of Mind (2000) University of Chicago Press, United States.
• Carey, John The Faber Book of Utopias (1999) Faber and Faber, London.
• Deleuze, Gilles and Guattari, Felix Anti-Oedipus
• Edwards, Paul N. The Closed World: Computers and the Politics of Discourse in Cold War America (1996) MIT Press, United States.
• Galison, Peter The Ontology of the Enemy (1994)
• Karatzogianni, Athina Power, Conflict and Resistance: Social Movements, Networks and Hierarchies (with Andrew Robinson) (2010)
• Karatzogianni, Athina The Politics of Cyberconflict (with Andrew Robinson) (2010)
• Milgram, Stanley Obedience to Authority (1974) Tavistock, UK.
• Poster, Mark and Savat, David (Editors) Deleuze and New Technology (2009) Edinburgh University Press, UK.
• Spufford, Francis Red Plenty (2010) Faber and Faber, UK.
• Vossoughian, Nader Otto Neurath: The Language of the Global Polis (2008) NAI Publishers, The Netherlands.
• Wiener, Norbert The Human Use of Human Beings: Cybernetics and Society (1988) Da Capo Press.
• Zizek, Slavoj (Ed) Mapping Ideology (2012) Verso
• Zizek, Slavoj Violence (2009) Profile Books