User:Eleanorg/thesis/draft1: Difference between revisions
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* ...as a lens for evaluating consensus production? | * ...as a lens for evaluating consensus production? | ||
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On my way home once I jeered and whistled back at a man who I saw harassing a woman on my street. And the unusual part was that he turned on his heel, and shouted, and I heard a passionate street lecture on the necessity of human reproduction. My life, he informed me, depended upon it. | On my way home once I jeered and whistled back at a man who I saw harassing a woman on my street. And the unusual part was that he turned on his heel, and shouted, and I heard a passionate street lecture on the necessity of human reproduction. My life, he informed me, depended upon it. | ||
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* I will eventually argue that closing this gap in consensus processes also could be an interesting method of production. | * I will eventually argue that closing this gap in consensus processes also could be an interesting method of production. | ||
* Talk of 'desire' leaves assumption of pre-existing autonomous desire unexamined; how/if to lead into a questioning of how desire is collaboratively formulated? | * Talk of 'desire' leaves assumption of pre-existing autonomous desire unexamined; how/if to lead into a questioning of how desire is collaboratively formulated? | ||
In defining consent, legal theorist Kleinig (2008) makes the distinction between agreeing /with/ something, and agreeing /to/ it. Consent is not valid, he claims, if we merely, privately agree with a proposal without communicating that we agree to it. It follows, inversely, that we may consent /to/ something /with/ which we disagree. | In defining consent, legal theorist Kleinig (2008) makes the distinction between agreeing /with/ something, and agreeing /to/ it. Consent is not valid, he claims, if we merely, privately agree with a proposal without communicating that we agree to it. It follows, inversely, that we may consent /to/ something /with/ which we disagree. | ||
Tied to slogans such as "yes means yes" and "consent is sexy", we lack the tools for engaging with the reality of this gap. | |||
However, increasing numbers of writers and activists are acknowledging this shortcoming in campaigns based solely on consent. "While part of living in community with other human beings involves saying 'yes' to things we'd rather not do," claims Shwayzer (2008), "this issue of consent and enthusiasm is very different when the subject is sex." In this domain, feminists are claiming, the gap between desire and consent should be closed. "Consent should be a baseline, the rock-bottom standard for sexual activity" says Kramer Bussel (2008, p.48), and our campaigns should be demanding more. | However, increasing numbers of writers and activists are acknowledging this shortcoming in campaigns based solely on consent. "While part of living in community with other human beings involves saying 'yes' to things we'd rather not do," claims Shwayzer (2008), "this issue of consent and enthusiasm is very different when the subject is sex." In this domain, feminists are claiming, the gap between desire and consent should be closed. "Consent should be a baseline, the rock-bottom standard for sexual activity" says Kramer Bussel (2008, p.48), and our campaigns should be demanding more. |
Latest revision as of 15:16, 23 January 2013
possible title/s / subtitles
"Nothing need happen"
- the ethics of indecision in feminist discussions of consent
- ...as a lens for evaluating consensus production?
0. Anecdote #1
On my way home once I jeered and whistled back at a man who I saw harassing a woman on my street. And the unusual part was that he turned on his heel, and shouted, and I heard a passionate street lecture on the necessity of human reproduction. My life, he informed me, depended upon it.
1. The challenge of consent
The feminist movement for consensual sexual relations makes a challenging claim in rejecting this position. Long campaigning under the banner "yes means yes and no means no", and currently in the process of narrowing its definitions of valid consent even further (), this movement demands an unusually high tolerance for indecision and inaction.
[ Question - do I introduce Consensus here as a parrallel movement, which makes similar demands and also promises - misleadingly - that it leads to everyone being happier...?]
By way of compensation (apology?), the attractions of consent are touted. "Consent is sexy", goes the motto, in apparent reply to my street lecturer and others of his view (RPFSD 200?, Consent is Sexy 2013).
The problem is, consent isn't always sexy. Consent means not always getting your way, means uncertainty, means awkward conversations (Nice Guys author?, 2008). Neither is consent synonymous with desire (Schwayzer, 2008). Having elevated 'consent' as a benchmark standard and key demand, these are realities which the feminist movement is wrestling with - and not always successfully [1]. Against this backdrop I will argue that, far from being weaknesses in the feminist argument for consent, an embrace of these awkward realities could be its greatest strength.
Contemporary feminist debates unpicking what is meant by "consent", and highlighting the inaccuracy of familiar slogans, do not discredit but enrich the mainstream feminist insistence upon consent. They outline an ethics of indecision which provides a powerful lens for examining other scenarios and systems in which consent is negotiated.
2. The gap between consent and desire
- Note: not sure where this fits in or how it follows from prev section.
- rationale: this is where feminist Consent differs from Consensus - the former requires this gap to be closed, the latter doesn't as it aims for decisions.
- I will eventually argue that closing this gap in consensus processes also could be an interesting method of production.
- Talk of 'desire' leaves assumption of pre-existing autonomous desire unexamined; how/if to lead into a questioning of how desire is collaboratively formulated?
In defining consent, legal theorist Kleinig (2008) makes the distinction between agreeing /with/ something, and agreeing /to/ it. Consent is not valid, he claims, if we merely, privately agree with a proposal without communicating that we agree to it. It follows, inversely, that we may consent /to/ something /with/ which we disagree.
Tied to slogans such as "yes means yes" and "consent is sexy", we lack the tools for engaging with the reality of this gap.
However, increasing numbers of writers and activists are acknowledging this shortcoming in campaigns based solely on consent. "While part of living in community with other human beings involves saying 'yes' to things we'd rather not do," claims Shwayzer (2008), "this issue of consent and enthusiasm is very different when the subject is sex." In this domain, feminists are claiming, the gap between desire and consent should be closed. "Consent should be a baseline, the rock-bottom standard for sexual activity" says Kramer Bussel (2008, p.48), and our campaigns should be demanding more.
- "What is Sexy? 'Sexy' is sex with consent... 'sexy' is talking about sex with your partner" goes the unconvincing copy of one current campaign, attempting to paper over the inconvenient difference between consent and desire. (http://www.consentissexy.net/consent)